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[L]aw, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.1 
 
The atmosphere surrounding today’s decision is one of make-believe. . . .   
When and if the Court awakes to reality, it will find a world very different from the 
one it expects.2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two decades ago, the nation was riveted by the saga of Mary Beth Whitehead, 
who entered into a surrogacy contract with William Stern under which she was to be 
impregnated with his sperm, carry and deliver the resulting child, and then turn the 
child over to Mr. and Mrs. Stern to be theirs and be paid $10,000.3  Whitehead got 
pregnant, delivered a healthy girl on March 27, 1986, initially turned over the child 
to the Sterns, then asked for the child back for a week and absconded with the child 
across state lines.4  The Sterns and Whitehead could not even agree on the child’s 
name:  to the Sterns she was Melissa, to Whitehead she was Sara.5  After Whitehead 
was apprehended in Florida and the child was returned to New Jersey, a New Jersey 
court held a thirty-two day trial, upheld the surrogacy contract, terminated 
Whitehead’s parental rights and allowed Mrs. Stern to adopt.6  In a much cited 
opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.7  The Court found that the 
surrogacy contract violated public policy and several aspects of New Jersey’s 
adoption act.8  It found that Whitehead was the child’s mother and that there was no 
basis to terminate her rights.9  The New Jersey Supreme Court noted the lack of 
statutory law on surrogacy and concluded with these words: 
If the Legislature decides to address surrogacy, consideration of this case 
will highlight many of its potential harms.  We do not underestimate the 
difficulties of legislating on this subject.  In addition to the inevitable 
confrontation with the ethical and moral issues involved, there is the 
question of the wisdom and effectiveness of regulating a matter so private, 
yet of such public interest.  Legislative consideration of surrogacy may 
also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall implications 
of the new reproductive biotechnology—in vitro fertilization, preservation 
                                                                
1 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (plurality opinion)(Scalia, J.). 
2 Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
3See PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M. (1988); MARY BETH 
WHITEHEAD WITH LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, A MOTHER’S STORY:  THE TRUTH ABOUT THE 
BABY M. CASE (1989). 
4In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1236-37 (N.J. 1988). 
5Robert Hanley, Baby M. Will Become Angry Over Legal Fight, Mother Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 8, 1987, at B1. 
6Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1237-38. 
7Id. at 1234-35. 
8Id. at 1240-50. 
9Id. at 1251-53. 
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of sperm and eggs, embryo implantation and the like.  The problem is how 
to enjoy the benefits of the technology—especially for infertile couples—
while minimizing the risk of abuse.  The problem can be addressed only 
when society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, 
yet promising, area.10 
Two decades later, despite the repeated efforts of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), many state legislatures have 
failed to address the difficult issues presented by surrogacy, and those that have done 
so have failed to legislate in a consistent, much less uniform, manner from one state 
to another.11 
One scholar has categorized four different judicial or legislative approaches to 
resolving questions of “legal maternity”:  (1) intent-based theory; (2) genetic 
contribution theory; (3) gestational mother preference theory; and (4) the “best 
interest of the child” theory.12  And, in many states, there is simply a legal void.13 
The inevitable results of legislative inaction and legislative and judicial 
inconsistency are well illustrated by the contemporary, and on-going, saga of the 
Erie “surrogate triplets.” 
On November 19, 2003, Danielle Bimber gave birth at the Hamot Medical Center 
in Erie, Pennsylvania, to triplet boys14 whom she named Matthew, Mark, and Micah 
Bimber.15  But the triplets’ father, an Ohio mathematics professor named James 
Flynn, and his paramour/fiancée, Eileen Donich, insisted that the triplets were, in 
fact, Easton, Lance, and Shane Flynn.16  Filling out the roster of actual and potential 
parents were the egg donor, Jennifer Rice, a young woman in Texas, and Douglas 
Bimber, husband of Danielle.17  And, in addition to Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Texas, 
there was yet another state with a connection to the matter, Indiana, the home base of 
Surrogate Mothers Inc. (“SMI”), which was responsible for bringing together, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the five adults who were ultimately to battle, directly or 
indirectly, over parenthood and custody (or parenting) of the children18 who were to 
                                                                
10Id. at 1264. 
11UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2002), available at http://www. 
law.upenn.edu/bll/ archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm.  See also J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 
12-22 (C.P. Erie 2004). 
12Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood:  Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational 
Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 622 (2003). 
13J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 13, 16. 
14Id. at 6. 
15Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261, 273 (C.P. Erie 2005), vacated sub nom., J.F. v. 
D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
16Id. at 264-66. 273. 
17Id. at 264.  See also Barbara White Stack, Multiple Moms, Dueling Dads in Case of 
Triplets Born in Erie Last Year, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 2004, at B1.  Although 
in some of the reported decisions involving the triplets the courts have used initials rather than 
names, I have opted to use the various players’ names in this article for the ease of the reader.  
These names all appear in published court decisions, as well as media reports. 
18J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4. 
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become known in the media, rather inartfully, as the “surrogate triplets.”19  But, 
obviously, whatever their names, they were and are very real children. 
The legal battles over the triplets controversy have taken place, and continue, in 
the state courts of three states:  Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana.  The litigation has 
even spilled over, quite improbably, into the federal bankruptcy court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  As of this writing,20 various legal issues remain 
unresolved.  This Article will explain the protracted legal battles over the “surrogate 
triplets” and explore potential legislation designed to avoid such battles in the future. 
Many of the facts surrounding the triplets’ births and early lives were hotly 
disputed; and, as will be seen, different courts have adopted different versions of 
those elusive facts.  However, as to some basics, there is no real disagreement.  
Danielle Bimber is a married woman residing in Pennsylvania with her husband, 
Douglas Bimber, and her three other children, Ryan, Brendan, and Julia.21  Danielle 
Bimber has held a few part-time, minimum wage jobs.22  Douglas Bimber is a self-
employed home appliance repairman, making approximately $9,600 per year.23  
Danielle had acquired much debt during her first marriage and, indeed, filed for 
bankruptcy while she was pregnant with the triplets.24 
In late 2001, the financially strapped Mrs. Bimber found SMI online and applied 
to be a surrogate mother.25  SMI, in turn, matched her with James Flynn and Eileen 
Donich.26  Flynn and Donich clearly occupy a different social and economic stratum 
than the Bimbers.  As a mathematics professor and department chair, Flynn earns 
$136,000 per year,27 many times the Bimbers’ reported income.  Dr. Donich, his 
paramour/fiancée, is a widowed dentist28 who receives yearly death benefits based on 
                                                                
19See e.g. Attorney:  Egg Donor Wants Parental Rights Over Surrogate Triplets, 
WKYC.COM, Dec. 8, 2004, http://www.wkyc.com/news/news_fullstory.asp?id=27377.  See 
also Stack, supra note 17, at B1. 
20February 2008. 
21Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 264, 266. 
22Id. at 266. 
23Id. at 264.  According to one media account, Mrs. Bimber was earning $11,000 per year 
when she worked.  Barbara White Stack, Custody Battle for Triplets Becomes Class Struggle, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 10, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/04192/344408.stm.  If this is accurate and if Mr. Bimber was accurately 
reporting his income (something which does not always occur with the self-employed), then 
they were living below the poverty level.  The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) set the 2003 federal poverty guidelines at $21,540 for a family of five, and 
$30,960 for a family of eight. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6456, 6457 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
24Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 265. 
25J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4. 
26Id. 
27Flynn, 70 Pa. D & C.4th at 264. 
28Surrogate Mom, Biological Dad Battle Over Triplets, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 1, 
2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/05/01/Worldandnation/Surrogate_mom__bio 
log.shtml. 
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the account of her long deceased husband.29  Moreover, according to media reports, 
there is an enormous age difference between Mrs. Bimber, on the one hand, and 
Flynn and Donich, on the other.  As of July 2004, Mrs. Bimber was reported as being 
30 years old, while Flynn and Donich were 62 and 60 respectively.30 
In the summer of 2002, Flynn, Mr. and Mrs. Bimber, and Jennifer Rice, the egg 
donor, signed a surrogacy contract drawn up by Steven Litz, SMI’s director and 
attorney.31  This surrogacy contract (also known as a “gestational agreement”) 
contained a number of salient provisions, some of which certainly appear to be in 
tension with others. 
The contract originally called for Flynn to pay Mrs. Bimber $15,000 for her 
services for carrying his child to term.32  He was to make a payment upon delivery of 
the child.33  Under handwritten additions to the agreement, Flynn was to pay Mrs. 
Bimber $1,000 per month for three months and $20,000 for a multiple birth.34  In all, 
Flynn paid Mrs. Bimber $24,000.35 
Section 3 of the contract provided that Mrs. Bimber was not consenting to 
termination of her parental rights or adoption, just indicating her intention to do so 
after the children were born.36 
Section 15 provided that if Mrs. Bimber were awarded custody of the children, 
she would have to reimburse Flynn any child support he might be ordered to pay as 
well as any moneys paid to her under the contract.37 
Section 20 provided that Flynn would be legally responsible for the children 
(unless a paternity test revealed that he was not the father).38  Significantly, the 
contract did not purport to identify a legal mother for the children, unless Flynn 
became unable to act as their father.  Section 21 provided that if something happened 
to Flynn, his paramour/fiancée, Donich, would be his successor.39  Thus, under 
paragraph 20, the children would have a legal father but no mother; but if paragraph 
21 became operational, they would have a mother but no father. 
                                                                
29Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 266.  Although in his testimony, Prof. Flynn described Dr. 
Donich as his fiancée, he also testified that no marriage date had been set and that they could 
not afford to give up the death benefits pension that Donich receives because “we really need 
the money.”  Id. 
30Stack, supra note 23. 
31J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 4. 
32Contract Between Biological Father, Egg Donor, and Surrogate Mother, dated July 13, 
2002, § 7A.  [hereinafter Contract](This is the surrogacy contract or “gestational agreement” 
prepared by SMI which gave rise to the saga of the Erie “surrogate triplets.”)    
33Id. 
34Id. 
35In re Bimber, 318 B.R. 297, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004). 
36Contract, supra note 32, at § 3. 
37Id., at § 15. 
38Id. at § 20. 
39Id. at § 21. 
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The contract contained a provision that it “shall be governed by and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the state of OH.”40  Finally there was a Release and hold 
harmless clause stating, “Upon the birth of the child, Surrogate and/or E.D. (egg 
donor) will surrender any custody rights to the child to the biological father.”41 
After signing the contract, the parties underwent extensive medical and 
psychological testing in late 2002 and early 2003.42  In April 2003, Mrs. Bimber was 
implanted with three embryos in Cleveland, Ohio.43  The embryos were the product 
of Flynn’s sperm and Rice’s eggs.44  Remarkably, the three embryos all took, and it 
soon became clear that Mrs. Bimber was carrying triplets.45  In June 2003, on 
doctor’s orders, Mrs. Bimber quit her employment.46  The doctor put Mrs. Bimber on 
bed rest from July 2003 until labor and delivery in November 2003.47 
The triplets were born by C-section at the Hamot Medical Center in Erie, 
Pennsylvania, on the morning of November 19, 2003.48  They were somewhat 
premature at 35 weeks and were placed in the neonatal intensive care unit 
(“NICU”).49  On November 22, Mrs. Bimber was discharged from the hospital.50  
And, on November 27, Hamot discharged the triplets to Mrs. Bimber.51  Litigation 
ensued. 
II.  WHOSE LAW?  WHAT LAW? 
The two most critical issues presented in the litigation were the parenthood and 
custody (parenting) of the triplets, although, as will be seen, there were and are other 
significant issues involved. 
Four states have a relationship to the case:  Indiana (home of Surrogate Mothers 
Inc., which brokered the agreement), Texas (home of the egg donor), Ohio (home of 
the biological father and his paramour and the state designated in the surrogacy 
contract as the source of law), and Pennsylvania (home of the surrogate mother and 
her husband, and birthplace of the triplets).  A review of the pertinent statutory 
provisions of these four jurisdictions demonstrates just how contradictory and 
inadequate is the current state of American law on surrogacy. 
Indiana’s statute provides: 
                                                                
40Id. at, § 31. 
41Id. at 9. 
42J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 4 (C.P. Erie 2004). 
43Id. at 5. 
44Flynn, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 264. 
45J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 5. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 6. 
49Id. 
50Id. 
51Id. at 8. 
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Legislative declarations.—The general assembly declares that it is against 
public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a 
surrogate to do any of the following:  
. . . . 
 (6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child. 
 
 (7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child.52 
 
The next section declares: 
Surrogate agreements void.—A surrogate agreement described in section 
1 [IC 31-20-1-1] of this chapter that is formed after March 14, 1988, is 
void.53 
Thus it is reasonably clear that under Indiana law, the surrogacy agreement at issue 
here would be void.  But that does not answer who would have rights of parenthood 
and custody. 
Texas law authorizes gestational agreements subject to certain restrictions: 
Gestational Agreement Authorized 
(a) A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, each 
donor, and each intended parent may enter into a written agreement 
providing that:  
. . . .  
(2) the prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, and 
each donor other than the intended parents, if applicable, relinquish all 
parental rights and duties with respect to a child conceived through 
assisted reproduction; 
(3) the intended parents will be the parents of the child; 
. . . . 
(a) The intended parents must be married to each other.54 
Thus it appears that Texas law would not authorize a gestational agreement where, as 
here, the intended parents (Flynn and Donich) were not married to each other.  
Moreover, Texas law contemplates that a gestational agreement be validated by a 
court.55  That was not done in this case.  In the absence of court validation, a 
gestational agreement is ineffective: 
                                                                
52IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (2007). 
53Id. at § 31-20-1-2. 
54TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (Vernon 2003). 
55Id. at §§ 160.755-56. 
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(a) A gestational agreement that is not validated as provided by this 
subchapter is unenforceable, regardless of whether the agreement is in a 
record. 
(b) The parent-child relationship of a child born under a gestational 
agreement that is not validated as provided by this subchapter is 
determined as otherwise provided by this chapter.56 
The chapter otherwise provides that “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
means of assisted reproduction.”57  Thus, under Texas law, Jennifer Rice would not 
be the mother, which makes sense as she never intended to raise the triplets.  
Apparently, James Flynn would not be the father, leaving Danielle Bimber as the 
mother and presumably her husband, Douglas, as the father. 
Ohio law addresses embryo donation as follows: 
 
Birth mother regarded as natural mother 
(A) A woman who gives birth to a child born as a result of embryo 
donation shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural mother of the 
child, and the child shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural 
child of the woman.  No action or proceeding under this chapter shall 
affect the relationship.58 
However: 
(E) This section deals with embryo donation for the purpose of 
impregnating a woman so that she can bear a child that she intends to raise 
as her child.59 
There does not appear to be any statutory law in Ohio addressing the situation where, 
at the time the woman was impregnated it was not for the purpose or with the 
intention that she raise the resulting child or children as her own, but she later 
changes her mind and decides to keep the child or children. 
Pennsylvania law, as will be seen, is silent on the subject of surrogacy.60 
III.  FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ERIE COUNTY, 
PENNSYLVANIA IN THE TRIPLETS CASE 
The triplets’ journey through the courts began with Flynn filing a complaint 
against Mrs. Bimber in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania, on 
December 11, 2003, seeking sole custody.61  That court eventually held at least four 
                                                                
56 Id. at § 160.762.  
57 Id. at § 160.702. 
58OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97(A) (West 2006). 
59Id. at § 3111.97(E). 
60J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th, 1, 17 (C.P. Erie 2004).  See generally Pennsylvania 
Domestic Relations Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. (1980). 
61J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 3; Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261, 263 (C.P. 
Erie 2005), vacated sub nom., J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).   
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/3
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days of hearings on the fate of the triplets.62  Mrs. Bimber filed an answer and 
counterclaim for custody.63  Significantly, as it turned out, Jennifer Rice, the egg 
donor and a party to the surrogacy contract, was not made a party to the litigation.64  
Nor was Douglas Bimber,65 despite the strong presumption in Pennsylvania that 
children born to a married woman are the children of her husband.66  Nor was Eileen 
Donich,67 despite her having been named in that contract as the triplets’ mother if 
something should happen to Flynn. 
Preliminarily, the Erie County Court issued an order granting temporary primary 
physical custody to Mrs. Bimber, but also providing five days a week “partial 
custody” to Flynn and Donich.68  Ultimately Common Pleas Judge Shad Connelly 
issued two published opinions concerning the triplets, one on April 4, 200469 and one 
on January 7, 2005.70  These opinions paint a picture of Flynn and Donich as being 
less than forthright regarding their own situation and Flynn in particular as 
demonstrating a curious lack of interest in the triplets.  As found by Judge Connelly, 
the trier of fact, the following scenario played out in 2003. 
In September 2003, SMI sent a letter to Hamot Medical Center that Mrs. Bimber, 
a surrogate mother planned to give birth to triplets at Hamot.71  The SMI letter said 
that Hamot should expect a court order (from some unspecified court), 
accompanying the intended parents, Flynn and Donich, that would give Flynn and 
Donich custody of the triplets after they were born.72 
When Mrs. Bimber went into labor on the morning of November 19, 2003, Flynn 
and Bimber were called and informed.73  They arrived at Hamot that evening, but did 
                                                                
62J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 3.  
63Id. 
64Id. at 4, n.4.  The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require a custody litigant to 
name the mother and father of the child as well as any person not a party to the proceedings 
who has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with 
respect to the child. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1915.15.  This rule implements a statutory requirement 
found in the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5425 (1980).   
65See J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 3. 
66E.g. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1990) (explaining that the 
presumption that a child born to a married woman is her husband’s child is “one of the 
strongest presumptions known to the law.”)(citation omitted). 
67J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 20. 
68Id. at 3.  Under the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5302 
(1980), “physical custody” is “the actual physical possession and control of a child,” and 
“partial custody” is “the right to take possession of a child away from the custodial parent for 
a certain period of time.” 
69J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 1. 
70Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261 (C.P. Erie 2005), vacated sub nom., J.F. v. D.B., 
897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
71J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 5. 
72Id. 
73Id. at 6. 
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not have a court order with them.74  Over the next few days, Donich maintained 
phone contact with the Hamot NICU staff.75  Flynn remained in the background, but 
did buy a mini-van with three child seats, plus other items for the triplets.76  On 
Saturday, November 22, Mrs. Bimber was discharged from Hamot, but the triplets 
remained in the hospital.77  That day, Donich called Mrs. Bimber and said that she 
and Flynn were very busy.78 
On Monday, November 24, Donich called Hamot to schedule sleep apnea 
monitor training.79  She also called Mrs. Bimber and told Mrs. Bimber that she and 
Flynn had visited the triplets over the prior weekend.  The following day, Tuesday, 
November 25, Mrs. Bimber called the Hamot NICU and learned that Flynn and 
Donich had not visited the triplets that weekend.80  Mrs. Bimber called SMI to 
express her concern about this.81 
Also on November 25, Donich called Hamot for an update and said that she and 
Flynn would arrive at Hamot that evening.82  That same day, Mrs. Bimber returned to 
Hamot and met with various personnel there.83  She expressed her concern about the 
fact that Flynn and Donich hadn’t visited the triplets since their original visit and 
hadn’t selected names for the triplets, and that Donich had lied about having visited 
them over the weekend.84  Mrs. Bimber decided that she would take the triplets home 
with her.85  Accordingly, as the triplets’ birth mother, she revoked her consent for 
Flynn and Donich to visit them.86  
When Flynn and Donich arrived at Hamot that evening as planned, they were met 
by hospital security.87  They were not allowed to visit and indeed were informed, 
falsely, that the triplets had been discharged.88  Upon their return to Ohio, they tried 
to call Mrs. Bimber to find out what was going on, but were only able to leave a 
message on her answering machine.89  However, SMI director Steven Litz did get 
                                                                
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78Id. 
79Id. at 7. 
80Id.  
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87Id. at 8. 
88Id.  An employee later testified that Flynn and Donich were given this misinformation 
for “safety reasons.”  Id. at 8, n.6. 
89Id. at 8. 
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them a message that Mrs. Bimber had changed her mind and intended to keep the 
triplets.90 
Two days after Hamot personnel told Flynn and Donich that the triplets had been 
discharged to Mrs. Bimber, Hamot did actually discharge the triplets to her.91  This 
was Thursday, November 27.92 
Between November 27 and December 11, Flynn and Donich left two phone 
messages for Mrs. Bimber, but she did not return those messages.93  They did not 
attempt to visit the triplets during this period, later claiming that they did not know 
where the triplets were.94 
After Flynn sued Danielle Bimber for custody of the triplets on December 11, 
2003, Erie County Judge Trucilla issued an order granting temporary custody to 
Bimber.95  Although that order permitted Flynn and Donich to visit the triplets five 
times a week,96 Judge Connelly subsequently found in April 2004 that they had only 
exercised that right two or three times a week.97  Flynn and Donich testified that Mrs. 
Bimber often cut the visits short, while Mrs. Bimber complained that Flynn did not 
really interact with the triplets during the visits.98 
Judge Connelly found Flynn less than forthright on many subjects.  Although 
“[Flynn] testified that he live[s] with . . . Donich, in her home located in Kirtland, 
Ohio . . . . [his] tax returns and legal pleadings filed in Ohio list his address as an 
apartment in Copley, Ohio.”99  Flynn alternated at hearings “between complaining 
about the amount of money he ha[d] spent in legal costs and boasting about the 
affluent neighborhood and schools of his alleged home in Kirtland, Ohio.”100  
Although he referred to Donich as his fiancée, he made it clear that they could not 
marry because she would lose the death benefits pension she receives and they 
“really need the money.”101  It appeared that Donich, rather than Flynn, was 
                                                                
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. 
93Id. 
94Id. 
95Id. at 3. 
96Id. 
97Id. at 8.  However, the judge failed to note that such visits entailed a roughly four hour 
long round trip.  Donich lives in Kirtland, Ohio.  Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261, 266 
n.2 (C.P. Erie 2005), vacated sub nom., J.F. v. D.B. 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  The 
Bimbers live in Corry, Pennsylvania.  Id. at 264.  According to Mapquest.com, it is a 104 mile 
drive between these two locations, which should take 1 hour, 52 minutes, Driving Directions 
from Kirtland, OH to Corry, PA, http://www.mapquest.com/directions (in the starting location 
section, type “Kirtland” in the city field and “OH” in the state field, then, in the ending 
location section type “Corry” in the city field and “PA” in the state field). 
98J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 8-9. 
99Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 266, n.2. 
100Id. at 266 (footnote omitted). 
101Id. 
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primarily responsible for the triplets’ care during periods when they had partial 
custody of the triplets.102  Sometimes during these visits, Donich was simultaneously 
taking care of her four grandchildren.103 
IV.  ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA, OPINION I:  STANDING (APRIL 2004) 
In his first published opinion, issued on April 2, 2004, Erie County Court of 
Common Pleas Judge Connelly had to determine who did and who did not have 
standing to assert custodial rights.104  Flynn had sued Mrs. Bimber for custody, and 
she had counterclaimed.105  But simply because Flynn had properly named Mrs. 
Bimber as a party in the custody litigation did not mean that she necessarily had a 
right to claim a custodial interest in the triplets.106  There was no question that Mrs. 
Bimber was not biologically related to them; their biological mother was Jennifer 
Rice,107 but Rice had not (as yet) come forward to assert maternal rights. 
Flynn argued that Mrs. Bimber was not the biological or legal mother of the 
triplets and, in any event, had agreed in the surrogacy contract to surrender to Flynn 
any custody rights she might have with regard to the triplets.108  If the surrogacy 
contract was found to be valid and binding, Flynn would prevail as a matter of 
contract law. 
Judge Connelly was confronted with a legal vacuum in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania with regard to surrogacy agreements.  No Pennsylvania statute directly 
addresses surrogacy.109  The only previously reported Pennsylvania case on 
surrogacy, Huddleston v. Infertility Center, involved a tort action by a surrogate 
mother against the agency which had arranged the surrogacy contract involving her 
and the sperm donor father, who ultimately killed the child she had carried.110  
Huddleston had no direct bearing on the instant case.111 
Judge Connelly conducted a brief survey of American law on surrogacy, and, not 
surprisingly, found it to be in disarray.112  Nineteen states have neither statutory nor 
case law on the subject.113  Sixteen states have made surrogacy itself or surrogacy 
contracts illegal.114  New Jersey prohibits paid surrogacy contracts, but free 
                                                                
102Id. at 268. 
103Id. 
104J.F. v. D.B.,66 Pa D. & C.4th 1, 3 (C.P. Erie 2004). 
105Id. 
106Van Coutren v. Wells, 633 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. 1993). 
107DNA testing demonstrated a 99.98-99.99% probability that Rice and Flynn are the 
biological parents of the triplets. Rice v. Flynn, 2005-Ohio-4667, ¶ 10. 
108J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 17-24. 
109Id. at 12-13. 
110700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
111J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 10-12. 
112Id. at 13-17. 
113Id. at 13. 
114Id. 
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surrogacy volunteers are permitted.115 There are also “[s]even states [that] generally 
allow surrogacy, with or without a contract, fees, etc.”116 
Several states have idiosyncratic statutory schemes.  According to Judge 
Connelly, “Illinois allows all ‘parents’ to be listed on [the] birth certificate, including 
the surrogate mother or gestational surrogate, the intended parents, the biological 
parents, and/or sperm and egg donors.”117 
Judge Connelly expressed concern about certain specific aspects of the surrogacy 
contract in this case: 
[C]ontractual inconsistencies and the failure to name a legal mother for 
these children greatly trouble the court.  Section 3 and the Release and 
hold harmless agreement contradict each other when [Mrs. Bimber] agrees 
that she intends to terminate her rights and then agrees that she will 
surrender her rights.  Sections 9 and 20, 20 and 21, 15 and 20, and 9 and 
20 are in conflict with each other in that section 20 says [Flynn] will be 
legally responsible for the children but the other sections undermine that 
responsibility by allowing it to “cease” or be “indemnified.”  At no time 
does the contract state who the legal mother of the children shall be, 
particularly if something were to happen to [Flynn] and [Donich], or if 
they were to decide not to take custody of the children.118 
Judge Connelly then turned to well-settled case law in Pennsylvania which 
establishes that a parent cannot “bargain away rights belonging to children.”119  The 
typical scenario is a woman who, either actually or allegedly, tells a man that if he 
will get her pregnant, she will never sue him for child support.  Such a bargain is 
normally unenforceable.120 
According to Judge Connelly, the surrogacy agreement purported to have the 
same effect as an agreement by a woman to absolve a man who gets her pregnant of 
the duty to pay child support.121  “The court therefore declares the surrogacy contract 
entered into by the parties to be void as against public policy because it does not 
provide for a legal mother for the triplets and it allows the parties to bargain away 
the children’s custody and support rights.”122 
This reasoning is questionable on a number of bases.  First, although there is a 
remarkable lack of explicit authority on the point, it is perfectly legal in 
Pennsylvania for a single woman to receive artificial insemination through a sperm 
                                                                
115Id. This is no doubt the direct result of In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
116J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 13. 
117Id. at 14. 
118Id. at 19 
119Id. at 21. 
120Id. at 21-22 (citing  Sams v. Sams, 808 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), Kesler v. 
Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). But see, Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. 
& C.4th 353 (C.P. Dauphin 2002), rev’d, No. 16 MAP 2005, 2007 WL 4555436 (Pa. 2007)) 
(creating exception for donor who provides sperm in a clinical setting for in vitro fertilization). 
121Id. at 22. 
122Id. 
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bank from an anonymous donor, which creates a child with no legal father.  Second, 
custody rights are deemed to be the rights of a parent, not of a child.  Indeed in the 
very next paragraph of his opinion, Judge Connelly states, “The contract allowed 
[Mrs. Bimber] to sign away her custodial rights . . . .”123  Third, although the 
surrogacy contract specifically provided that “this agreement shall be governed by 
and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of [Ohio],”124 Judge Connelly 
did not purport to do so, nor to explain why he was not doing so.  Fourth, the 
reasoning ignores the most obvious basis for voiding a contract whereby a woman is 
paid significant money for turning over her rights to a child she has carried:  the rules 
against baby selling.  Other courts have struck down surrogacy contracts on this 
basis, most notably the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M. case.125 
Of course, Judge Connelly’s voiding of the surrogacy contract did not, by itself, 
resolve the question of whether Mrs. Bimber possessed any custodial rights.  So, 
Judge Connelly turned to the question of who exactly is the legal mother of the 
triplets.126  There were three possible candidates:  the egg donor, Jennifer Rice; 
Flynn’s paramour/fiancée, Eileen Donich; and their surrogate mother, Danielle 
Bimber. 
Judge Connelly proceeded by a process of elimination.  He found that Rice could 
not be the legal mother solely “because she is not a party to this action.”127  Again, 
this reasoning seems flawed.  It suggests that a biological parent can lose parental 
rights simply because a contestant fails to name him or her as a party to custody 
litigation. 
Next, Judge Connelly found that Donich is not the legal mother:  “It cannot be 
[Donich] who is not genetically related to them, nor is she even married to [Flynn].  
She has contributed nothing more than her presence and her interest in the 
triplets.”128 This reasoning overlooks the fact, that while the surrogacy contract could 
have been more explicit on the point, clearly the original intention of all concerned 
was for Donich to become the mother by adoption of any children resulting from the 
surrogacy.  In other surrogacy cases, courts have found parenthood based on 
intention.  For example, in the Buzzanca case,129 an appellate court in California 
found that a formerly married couple, who had agreed to have an embryo which was 
not biologically related to either of them implanted in a surrogate mother, were the 
legal parents of the resulting child because that was their original intention.  After 
their marriage broke up, the husband had argued unsuccessfully that he had no 
paternal obligations. 
                                                                
123Id. (emphasis added). 
124See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
125In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Of course, in the Baby M. case, the surrogate 
mother was also the biological mother.  For a similar result, see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 
(Mass. 1998). 
126J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 23-24 (C.P. Erie 2004). 
127Id. 
128Id. at 24. 
129Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
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Having eliminated the egg donor and the paramour/fiancée of the sperm donor as 
legal mother, Judge Connelly was left with only the surrogate mother, Danielle 
Bimber. 
That leaves [Danielle Bimber], who like [Donich] is not genetically 
related to the triplets, but carried them in her womb and then gave birth to 
them.  Her every decision prior to their birth has affected them – health, 
nutrition, prenatal care, etc.  In addition, she has not terminated any 
parental rights she may have to the triplets.  She has instead taken the 
triplets into her home and cared for them along with her three other 
children.  She is more a mother and a parent by her actions than by 
genetics.  She has assumed “maternity” if there were such a legal 
definition as there exists for “paternity.”  Since the contract is void 
because it does not provide for a legal mother, the court finds [Danielle 
Bimber] to be the legal mother of the triplets since she carried and bore 
them and has taken care of them as a natural parent would.130 
Perhaps realizing that his conclusion that Danielle Bimber is the triplets’ legal 
mother rested on rather shaky legal foundations, Judge Connelly found an alternative 
basis for granting her standing to assert custodial rights.  He found that she “most 
likely” stood “in loco parentis” to the triplets.131 
The “in loco parentis” doctrine allows a non-parent who has acted in the place of 
a parent to have standing in the place of a parent in a subsequent custody dispute.  
The problem with granting Mrs. Bimber “in loco parentis” standing was that an 
essential element of this status is that one cannot have acted in defiance of a parent’s 
wishes.132  Thus if a parent turns a child over to, say, her aunt to care for and then 
disappears for an indefinite period of time, the aunt would be acting in loco parentis.  
But, if the aunt simply snatched the child from the parent’s chosen babysitter, the 
aunt would not be in loco parentis. 
Clearly Mrs. Bimber had taken the triplets in defiance of their father’s wishes.  
Conflating the standing issue with a best interests analysis, Judge Connelly found 
that Flynn and Donich had shown a lack of consistent interest in the triplets in a 
variety of ways and had failed to exhaust all legal avenues to obtain their return.133  
Accordingly, he concluded that Mrs. Bimber had not truly acted in defiance of 
Flynn’s wishes. 
Again, this analysis is hardly convincing, especially in light of the legal battle 
Flynn was pursuing in Pennsylvania (and, by then as will be seen, also in Ohio) to 
obtain the triplets.  Perhaps a more cogent, if novel, rationale would have been that 
Mrs. Bimber acquired in loco parentis standing when, with the concurrence of all 
                                                                
130J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 24. 
131Id.  Elsewhere in the same opinion, Judge Connelly definitively concludes that Danielle 
Bimber “has standing in loco parentis to pursue both custody and child support for [the 
triplets].”  Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
132See B.A. v. E.E. ex rel C.E., 741 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. 1999) (citing Gradwell v. 
Strausser, 610 A.2d 999, 1003 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). 
133J.F., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th at 29-32. 
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interested parties, she took custody in utero of the three embryos that developed into 
the triplets. 
In any event, Judge Connelly concluded that Mrs. Bimber had standing to 
maintain her custody counterclaim and that Flynn had a legal duty to provide child 
support.134  He referred both matters, custody and support, to conferences before 
those agencies of the county court which usually deal with such issues in the first 
instance.135 
V.  SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, OPINION ON PARENTHOOD AND  
PARENTING (OCTOBER 2004) 
On April 22, 2004, twenty days after the Erie, Pennsylvania, Court ruled that 
Jennifer Rice, the egg donor, was not the triplets’ mother, Jennifer Rice filed suit 
against Flynn and the Bimbers in the Summit County Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 
seeking a determination of a mother-child relationship between herself and the 
triplets.136  She also sought a declaration that the Bimbers had no parental rights with 
respect to the children.137  Flynn, a nominal defendant, admitted all of Rice’s 
allegations, and also sought a declaration that the Bimbers had no parental rights.138 
The Bimbers acknowledged that Flynn was the triplets’ biological father but 
asserted they lacked sufficient information to know whether Rice was the biological 
mother.139  Accordingly, as previously noted, DNA testing was performed and 
demonstrated a 99.98-99.99% probability that Flynn and Rice were the triplets’ 
biological parents.140 
In essence, the Ohio litigation was a fight over two issues:  parenthood of the 
triplets (i.e. who are their legal parents) and parenting of the triplets (i.e. who is 
entitled to what rights of custody, visitation and access to the triplets).  But, before 
the Ohio court could address either of these issues, it first had to determine whether 
it had jurisdiction to do so or was barred by the earlier orders from the Pennsylvania 
court.  This question has federal constitutional dimensions, as the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution provides: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.141 
                                                                
134Id. at 33. 
135Id. 
136Complaint at 3, Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Summit Apr. 22, 
2004). 
137Id. 
138Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-claim of Defendant, J.F., Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-
1561 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Summit June 4, 2004). 
139Defendants D.B. and D.B.’s Answer to Complaint, Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Summit June 14, 2004). 
140See supra note 107. 
141U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
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The Congress has enacted a general law to implement the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause as it pertains to custody determinations; that law is the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA).142  The PKPA was intended to prevent a parent who is 
unhappy with a custody determination issued in State A from trying to relitigate the 
case in State B in order to get a more favorable result.  The Congress wanted to 
ensure that two States would not issue inconsistent custody orders with regard to the 
same children.143 
Additionally, the States have endeavored through their legislatures to enact 
uniform laws governing jurisdictional disputes in custody cases.  The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has addressed this 
matter twice.  First, in 1968, NCCUSL proposed the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which was eventually enacted in all States.144  Then, in 
1997, NCCUSL proposed a similar, but strengthened and clarified law, the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),145 which forty-six  
States plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands have now enacted to 
replace the UCCJA.146 
Mrs. Bimber asserted that the PKPA and UCCJA prohibited Ohio from making a 
parenting decision and that Rice’s entire case should be dismissed.147 
On October 29, 2004, Summit County Court Judge John P. Quinn issued his 
decision that, not unlike King Solomon, split the difference.148  Regarding the 
existence of a parent-child relationship, Judge Quinn found one to exist between 
Rice and the triplets, and one to exist between Flynn and the triplets.149  However, 
Judge Quinn was unwilling to rule out, or rule on, the existence of a parent-child 
relationship between Mrs. Bimber and the triplets.150  That matter, said the judge, 
was subject to the continuing exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court.151  
Thus, Judge Quinn’s decision left the triplets in the anomalous position of having 
                                                                
14228 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).  
143See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 177, 180-83 (1988) (“As the legislative 
scheme suggests, and as Congress explicitly specified, one of the chief purposes of the PKPA 
is to ‘avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts.’”) 
144The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Why States 
Should Adopt the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, http://www. 
nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_why/uniformacts-why-uccjea.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2007). 
145Id. 
146See NCCUSL.org, Final Push for Nationwide Enactment of UCCJEA: South Carolina 
Joins 45 Other States with Enactment of Important Child Custody Bill, http://www. 
nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp. (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). 
147Defendants D.B.’s and D.B.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion for Summary Judgment, Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
Summit Sept. 30, 2004) 
Rice v. Flynn, supra note 107, at **6, para. 12. 
148Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 (Ohio C.P. Summit May 12, 2006). 
149Id., slip. op. at 5. 
150Id., slip. op. at 6. 
151Id. 
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one legal father (Flynn), as well as two legal mothers (Jennifer Rice in Ohio and 
Danielle Bimber in Pennsylvania), neither of whom ironically had been intended to 
be their mother under the surrogacy contract. 
With regard to the parenting (i.e. custody) determination, Judge Quinn likewise 
found that Ohio lacked jurisdiction, as that matter lay within the continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania.152 
Both Rice and the Bimbers appealed various aspects of this decision to the Court 
of Appeals of Ohio.153 
VI.  THE BANKRUPTCY COURT WEIGHS IN, AND BOWS OUT (DECEMBER 2004) 
The litigation over the “surrogate triplets” generated significant media attention, 
one indirect result of which was that the bankruptcy trustee who had been assigned 
Mrs. Bimber’s 2003 bankruptcy action filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court to 
revoke the financial discharge that court had granted her.154  The trustee argued that 
Mrs. Bimber’s failure to reveal to the Bankruptcy Court the surrogacy contract she 
had signed in 2002 and the $24,000 she was to receive under it justified 
revocation.155 
Mrs. Bimber argued that the surrogacy contract was either void or voidable and 
that, even though she had already received $1,000, she would not receive any 
additional compensation under the contract until the children were born.156  
Moreover, she was granted her bankruptcy discharge in October 2003, one month 
before the triplets’ birth.157 
In a very brief opinion, filed in December 2004, the Bankruptcy Court denied the 
trustee’s request to revoke Mrs. Bimber’s discharge of debt.158  The bankruptcy judge 
cited with approval authority indicating that a contract for personal services is not 
part of the bankruptcy estate.159  Thus, even if Mrs. Bimber should have disclosed the 
surrogacy contract to the bankruptcy court, her failure to do so did not prejudice the 
bankruptcy procedure.160 
VII.  ERIE PENNSYLVANIA OPINION II:  CUSTODY (JANUARY 2005) 
After various intermediate steps, the issue of custody of the triplets, and various 
related matters, returned to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, 
                                                                
152Id. slip. op. at 4. 
153See Notice of Cross Appeal, Rice v. Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 (Ohio Com. Pl. Summit 
Dec. 2, 2004); Defendants, Danielle Bimber and Douglas Bimber’s Notice of Appeal, Rice v. 
Flynn, No. 2004-04-1561 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Summit Nov. 24, 2004) 
154In re Bimber, 318 B.R. 297  297 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2004). 
155Id. at 298. 
156Id. 
157Id. 
158Id. at 300. 
159Id. at 299. 
160Id. at 300. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/3
2008] WHAT THE ERIE “SURROGATE TRIPLETS” CAN TEACH 19 
Pennsylvania, and on January 7, 2005, Judge Connelly issued his second published 
decision regarding the triplets.161 
The fact that Judge Connelly had previously found Mrs. Bimber not only to have 
“in loco parentis” standing, but also to be the triplets’ legal mother, had significant 
implications for deciding custody on the merits.  Where a custody battle is between 
two parents, “the burden of proof is shared equally by the contestants.”162  But where 
a custody fight is between a parent and a non-parent who has been granted in loco 
parentis status,  the evidentiary scale is “tipped hard to the biological parent’s 
side.”163 
Judge Connelly reviewed much of the territory covered in his April 2004 
opinion.164  In addition to testimony from the parties, there was presented on behalf 
of Flynn the deposition of Amy Hokaj, a licensed independent social worker in Ohio 
who works as an “adoption assessor” for Adoption Circle, a private agency.165  Hokaj 
had been hired by Donich to perform home studies precedent to an adoption of the 
triplets by Donich in Ohio.166  Hokaj found Donich’s home to be adequate for raising 
the triplets.167 
Judge Connelly was concerned, however, about various inadequacies he 
perceived in Hokaj’s home study.168  Hokaj only addressed Flynn and Donich as 
parents and did not compare them to the Bimbers.169  Judge Connelly noted 
inconsistencies between Hokaj’s report and other information.170  For example, 
Donich had stated that she was being treated for osteoporosis on the medical 
statement of foster/adoptive applicant section of Hokaj’s report, but denied she had 
osteoporosis at trial.171  Flynn told Hokaj he was an only child, but elsewhere 
acknowledged that he has a younger sister.172 
Judge Connelly expressed other concerns about Flynn and Donich.  For example, 
they both refused to use the triplets’ legal names;173 and, at trial, Flynn referred to 
them using terms such as “this one” and “that one.”174 
                                                                
161Flynn v. Bimber, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th  261 (C.P. Erie 2005), vacated sub nom., J.F. v. 
D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
162Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2000). 
163T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 919 n.8 (Pa. 2001); Charles, 744 A.2d at 1258. 
164Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 286-88. 
165Id. at 269. 
166Id. at 269-70. 
167Id. at 272. 
168Id. at 272-73. 
169Id. at 272. 
170Id. at 273. 
171Id. 
172Id. 
173Id. 
174Id. at 274. 
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Before turning to his decision on the merits, Judge Connelly addressed the 
jurisdictional issues raised in his court and the Ohio courts.175  Citing both the 
UCCJA and its successor, the UCCJEA, as well as the PKPA, Judge Connelly found 
that Pennsylvania has jurisdiction.176  It was the triplets’ “home state” within the 
meaning of those statutes.177 
Again Judge Connelly addressed the status of the egg donor, Rice.178  He 
explained that in his April 2004 opinion he had treated her as he would have treated 
an anonymous sperm donor.179  She had only come forward after that opinion was 
issued, by asserting parental rights in Ohio.180  She never sought to assert such rights 
in the Pennsylvania litigation although she was clearly aware of that litigation.181  
Since a custody determination had to be made, Judge Connelly decided to do so 
without Rice’s involvement.182 Judge Connelly noted that “[i]f Rice truly wants to 
become involved, the court can amend its custody order and join her as a party at a 
later date.”183  Thus, like Judge Quinn in Ohio, Judge Connelly in Pennsylvania left 
open the possibility that the triplets might end up with two legal mothers, as well as a 
father. 
On the merits, Judge Connelly concluded that as between Flynn and Mrs. 
Bimber, Mrs. Bimber “is the better caretaker by far, and primary custody should 
remain with her.”184  Although she had not initially intended to raise the triplets, she 
had stepped in when she and personnel at Hamot perceived that Flynn and Donich 
exhibited an extraordinary lack of interest in the newborns.185  She was the triplets’ 
“primary caretaker.”186 
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177d. at 277. 
178Id. at 274-86. 
179Id. at 285. 
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182Id. at 286. 
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184Id. at 291. 
185Id. 
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physical and psychological needs. 
Id. 1115 (footnote omitted). 
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By contrast, Judge Connelly was critical of the fact that when the triplets spend 
time with Flynn and Donich they take the children out to many places, mostly to 
show them off in public.187 Judge Connelly explained that “[w]hile the court does not 
condemn occasional outings, it does recognize the children’s need for a stable home 
environment surrounded by loving family, not curious strangers.”188 
Of course, much of Judge Connelly’s praise of Mrs. Bimber and criticism of 
Flynn and Donich stem from the natural consequences of Mrs. Bimber having been 
awarded temporary custody of the triplets by the Erie County court shortly after their 
birth.  Had Flynn and Donich won temporary custody, assuredly they would have 
become the triplets’ primary caretakers who would have attended to their medical 
needs, etc.  While they might not have been as “hands on” as Mrs. Bimber, there was 
no evidence that they would have been unable or unwilling to attend to the triplets’ 
basic needs.  Indeed, Judge Connelly proceeded to award Flynn extensive periods of 
partial custody,189 including every weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening, 
a seven-day vacation period, and shared holidays.190  Such an order would obviously 
have been completely inappropriate had Judge Connelly found that Flynn and 
Donich’s care was detrimental to the triplets’ best interests. 
Judge Connelly also addressed two related matters:  the triplets’ names and child 
support.  Mrs. Bimber had named the children Matthew, Mark, and Micah Bimber 
six days after they were born, and those names were placed on their birth 
certificates.191  While Flynn had not specifically petitioned to change their names, he 
and Donich maintained that the triplets were Easton, Lance, and Shane Flynn.192 
Judge Connelly treated this question as though a name change petition had been 
filed.  Under Pennsylvania law, a person petitioning to change a child’s name must 
show why the proposed new name is better than the current name and in the child’s 
best interests.193  The judge concluded that Flynn had had “more than ample 
opportunity to provide names for the children” when they were born, but had failed 
to do so.194  Mrs. Bimber named them by default, when they were six days old, as the 
only alternative to continuing to refer to them as Baby A, B and C.195 
The judge quite properly found that it was contrary to the triplets’ best interests 
to be called by two different sets of names.196  This could only cause them 
                                                                
187Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 292. 
188Id. 
189See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5302 (West 2007)(“The right to take possession of a 
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190Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 310-11. 
191Id. at 302. 
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193Id.  See In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992); In re C.R.C., 819 A.2d 558, 560 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
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“confusion and uncertainty.”197  Judge Connelly reasoned that “[b]y choosing to 
delay, [Flynn] must now accept the names Matthew, Mark and Micah as the names 
of the children,” use those names and be responsible for making sure that those 
around him do likewise.198  However, since Flynn is the triplets’ father, and although 
Flynn did not specifically ask the court to do so, Judge Connelly ordered that the 
triplets’ last name be changed from Bimber to Flynn.199 
Although the judge criticized Flynn for having failed to name the triplets during 
the first six days of their lives, it is at best unclear under Pennsylvania law what 
would have happened had Flynn tried to give them the names he intended and Mrs. 
Bimber had tried to give them her preferred names.  Pennsylvania simply does not 
address this situation.  Under one regulatory provision, “[t]he child of a married 
woman and a man who is not the mother’s husband, may be registered as the child of 
the biological father if” her husband does not object.200  But this does not answer 
who has naming rights, nor, indeed, who is the mother in the case of gestational 
surrogacy.  Normally, where a child is born to a married couple in Pennsylvania, 
they share naming rights with each other, unless they are “divorced or separated at 
the time of the child’s birth,” in which case “the choice of surname rests with the 
parent who has custody of the newborn child.”201  Pennsylvania law provides that 
“[t]he child of an unmarried woman may be registered with any surname requested 
by the mother.”202 
Finally, Judge Connelly incorporated into the decision a previously entered order 
directing Flynn to pay child support to Mrs. Bimber.203  Flynn appealed to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.204 
VIII.  SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, COURT ADDRESSES VALIDITY OF SURROGACY 
CONTRACT (MAY 2005) 
In 2004, Flynn brought an action against both Danielle and Douglas Bimber in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, sounding in breach of 
contract.205  He demanded return of all funds he had paid in connection with the 
surrogacy agreement and all child support he had already paid pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania court order, plus attorney fees.206 
In a brief decision issued on May 11, 2005, the Summit County Court denied 
Flynn relief and entered judgment for the Bimbers.207  Judge Mary F. Spicer reasoned 
                                                                
197Id. 
198Id. 
199Id. at 304-5. 
20028 PA. CODE § 1.5 (2007). 
201Id. at § 1.7. 
202Id. at § 1.6. 
203Flynn, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 314. 
204J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
205J.F. v. D.B., Summit No. CV 04 02 1218 slip op. at 1-2 (Ohio C.P. May 11, 2005). 
206Id. at 2. 
207Id. at 7.  
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that a parent cannot contract away her parental rights.208  Although an Ohio court 
might have reached a different result, the Erie County, Pennsylvania, Court had 
concluded that Mrs. Bimber was the triplets’ legal mother.209  Therefore, any 
provision in the surrogacy contract that required Mrs. Bimber to relinquish her 
parental rights was simply unenforceable.210  Similarly, it is settled in Ohio that, “[a] 
father cannot, by contract, escape his responsibility for adequate support of a minor 
child.”211  Accordingly, the contract’s provision for reimbursement of child support 
was also unenforceable.212  Flynn appealed this decision also.213 
IX.  ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, COURT TERMINATES EGG DONOR’S PARENTAL 
RIGHTS (JUNE 2005) 
In his January 2005 opinion, Judge Connelly left open the possibility of 
subsequently granting parental rights to Jennifer Rice, the egg donor.214  Five months 
later, however, in June 2005, the judge filed a “journal entry” in the Erie County 
Court docket terminating her parental rights to the triplets.215  This set up a direct 
conflict with the Summit County, Ohio, Court’s October 2004 decision declaring 
Rice to have a parent-child relationship with the triplets. 
X.  FURTHER CONFLICTS:  THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS (SEPT. 2005) 
In September 2005, the Ohio Court of Appeals (Ninth Appellate District) 
reviewed Summit County Judge Quinn’s October 2004 decision, which had granted 
Jennifer Rice a parent-child relationship with the triplets but deferred to 
Pennsylvania on the issues of Mrs. Bimber’s rights as a parent and custodial 
arrangements for the triplets.216 
Rice argued that the trial court should not have found that it lacked jurisdiction to 
address the Bimbers’ legal rights vis-à-vis the triplets.217  Under the federal Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), for a state’s custody determination to be 
entitled to full faith and credit, “reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall 
be given to the contestants, [and] any parent whose parental rights have not been 
                                                                
208Id. at 5. 
209Id. at 6. 
210Id. 
211Id. (citing Byrd v. Byrd, 20 Ohio App. 2d 183 (1969), paragraph one of syllabus). 
212Id. at 6-7. 
213J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
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D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
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previously terminated . . . .”218  Pennsylvania law also requires such notice “[b]efore 
a child custody determination is made . . . .”219 
Rice was unquestionably the genetic/biological mother of the triplets.220  The 
Ohio Court of Appeals found it to be inconsistent for Erie County, Pennsylvania, 
Judge Connelly to have declared the surrogacy contract to be void but then not have 
treated Rice as the biological parent that she was.221  The Ohio court concluded that 
because the Erie County Court failed to give Rice proper notice and the opportunity 
to be heard, its decisions regarding Mrs. Bimber’s legal relationship to the triplets 
and her custodial rights were not entitled to full faith and credit and were not binding 
on the Ohio courts.222  Accordingly, the Ohio Court of Appeals remanded these 
issues to the Summit County, Ohio, Court for determination.223 
The Ohio Court of Appeals did agree with the Bimbers on one point.  The 
Summit County Court had not considered whether either Flynn or Rice had waived 
or relinquished their parental rights by their actions or inactions.224  The Court of 
Appeals decreed that the Summit County Court must address this issue on remand.225  
While there might arguably have been some basis for this contention with regard to 
Rice, it is difficult to understand how it could apply to Flynn.  Not only had Flynn 
promptly sued for custody, but Mrs. Bimber had successfully sued him, as the father, 
for child support. 
XI.  BREACH OF CONTRACT REDUX, OHIO COURT OF APPEALS (MARCH 2006) 
In March 2006, the Ohio Court of Appeals (Ninth Appellate District) issued a 
second opinion, this one reviewing the Summit County Court’s dismissal of Flynn’s 
breach of contract action in which he sought to recover the money paid to the 
Bimbers under the surrogacy agreement, as well as child support he had been 
ordered to pay.226  As noted, the Ohio trial court had, like the Erie County, 
Pennsylvania, Court, declared the surrogacy contract void as against public policy.227  
The Ohio Court of Appeals, finding the surrogacy contract to be valid and 
enforceable, reversed.228   
                                                                
21828 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (2000). 
21923 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5425(a) (2004). 
220See supra note 107. 
221Rice, 2005-Ohio-4667, at ¶ 32. 
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The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Ohio law the individuals who provide 
a child’s genes are the natural parents and “[i]f the genetic providers have not waived 
their rights and have decided to raise the child, then they must be recognized as the 
natural and legal parents.”229  The court found that, “Flynn and Rice were the genetic 
providers, so Flynn and Rice were the children’s parents under Ohio law.”230  While 
this conclusion makes perfect sense as to Flynn, it appears to be completely baseless 
as to Rice since she had specifically waived her parental rights in Section 3 of the 
surrogacy agreement which provided: 
[Egg Donor] agrees that she shall have no rights, by descent or otherwise, 
to any eggs, the resulting embryo(s) if any, the fetus(es) if any, and/or the 
child, if any, as a result of the procedure, and that by signing this 
document, she is waiving any such rights.231 
The Ohio Court of Appeals is rather more persuasive in its reasoning as to the 
Bimbers.  Since they were not the triplets’ parents, they had “no parental rights to 
contract away.”232  Even though a Pennsylvania trial court had later given Mrs. 
Bimber parental rights (in a decision not entitled to full faith and credit), neither of 
the Bimbers had parental rights at the time they signed the surrogacy agreement.233  
Thus the agreement did not violate public policy by their waiving of parental rights 
they simply did not then possess.234   Since the Bimbers unquestionably had breached 
the contract by taking the triplets and suing for custody, the appeals court concluded 
that they were liable for restitution of the monies paid by Flynn under the contract, as 
well as for his attorney fees.235 
Next the Court of Appeals turned to Flynn’s damages relating to child support.236  
Section 15 of the surrogacy agreement specifically addressed this issue: 
In the event custody is awarded to [Mr. and Mrs. Bimber], [Mr. Flynn] 
shall be indemnified by [Mr. and Mrs.  Bimber] for any and all monies he 
is required to pay for child support, or pregnancy expenses pursuant to 
court order.  [Mr. Flynn] shall be entitled to immediate reimbursement 
from [Mr. and Mrs. Bimber] for all monies and/or other forms of 
consideration paid to [the Bimbers] pursuant to this agreement.237 
The Summit County Court had declared this provision void based on settled 
“Ohio’s public policy prohibiting parents from abrogating their obligations to 
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support their children through a private agreement.”238  Again, the appeals court 
disagreed.  The appeals court found that this provision was not an abrogation of a 
child support obligation.239  Rather, it simply meant that “if the Bimbers decide to 
seek and obtain custody of the child (or children), then they would become the legal 
parents and no longer merely the surrogate.”240  In that case, “the surrogacy 
agreement would terminate, and under the agreement Flynn would be treated as 
merely the sperm donor and not the parent.”241  Since a sperm donor is not obligated 
to pay child support under Ohio law, this indemnification provision does not violate 
Ohio public policy.242  Accordingly, the Ohio appeals court concluded, “Mr. and 
Mrs. Bimber are liable to Flynn for all monies that he has been required to pay to 
them by court order, such as child support . . . .”243 
The rationale for this conclusion seems, at best, strained.  It is difficult to 
understand how the appeals court could have equated Flynn with an anonymous 
sperm donor who does not assert parental rights and becomes a legal stranger to the 
resulting child or children.  Flynn never claimed in any litigation that he was not the 
father of the triplets nor that he did not want to exercise parental rights.  The result of 
the Bimbers’ breach of contract left Flynn as the triplets’ legal father under all the 
judicial decisions in both Pennsylvania and Ohio.  Similarly, Mr. Bimber never 
argued to any court that he was the father nor claimed any custodial rights 
whatsoever.  To the extent that the appeals court’s reasoning suggests that Mr. and 
Mrs. Bimber ever became the joint parents of the triplets upon termination of the 
surrogacy contract or by order of any court, it is not based in fact. 
XII.  THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT SPEAKS (APRIL 2006) 
On April 21, 2006, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (an intermediate court of 
appeals) rendered its decision on the appeal from Erie County regarding custody of 
the triplets and termination of the egg donor’s (Rice’s) parental rights.244  Anyone 
expecting clarification from the court as to the law in Pennsylvania on surrogacy 
contracts was doomed to be disappointed.  The appellate court completely side-
stepped the issue.245 
First, the Superior Court provided its rendition of the facts of the case in a 
manner almost completely at odds with the trial court.  Whereas Judge Connelly had 
found that Flynn and Donich could not marry because of Donich’s need to continue 
receiving survivor’s benefits, the Superior Court found that “the couple has always 
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been willing to give up the pension and marry, if necessary, to obtain custody of the 
triplets.”246 
More significantly, while the trial court had painted a picture of Mrs. Bimber 
stepping in to care for the triplets after Flynn and Donich had failed to carry out 
natural parental duties and expectations while the triplets were hospitalized as 
newborns at Hamot, the Superior Court found that it was Mrs. Bimber who had 
thwarted Flynn and Donich.  The court emphasized that Flynn and Donich had 
attended Mrs. Bimber’s pre-natal visits until Mrs. Bimber told them to stop.247  Mrs. 
Bimber thought that Donich called her too frequently while she was carrying the 
triplets, and asked her not to call so often.248  When Mrs. Bimber had to go on bed 
rest, she asked Flynn for additional money ($1,000 a month for four months), which 
he paid her although he was not obligated to do so under the surrogacy agreement.249   
Although Donich expressed a desire to be present for the triplets’ birth, Mrs. 
Bimber scheduled a caesarian section delivery without informing Flynn or Donich, 
so that Donich could not be there.250  Mrs. Bimber did call SMI the morning of the C-
section, and Flynn and Donich did arrive at Hamot that evening to visit the triplets.251  
Mrs. Bimber then expressed concern that Flynn and Donich had not subsequently 
visited the triplets while they were at Hamot,252 but it was Mrs. Bimber’s failure to 
inform Flynn and Donich that she had scheduled the C-section which prevented 
Donich from making alternate arrangements that week for the care of her own 
grandchildren.253  Although Mrs. Bimber expressed to Hamot personnel her concern 
about the lack of visits by Flynn and Donich,254 no Hamot staff member had 
expressed such a concern, and later the NICU doctor testified that under the 
circumstances the lack of visits was “not that unusual.”255   
Mrs. Bimber told Hamot personnel that Flynn and Donich were “not fit to be 
parents,”256 but they had actually taken all reasonable steps to get ready to take the 
triplets home.257  Mrs. Bimber cut off Flynn and Donich’s visiting rights at Hamot.258  
Flynn and Donich drove from Ohio to Pennsylvania to visit the triplets, only to have 
Hamot personnel lie to them and tell them that the triplets had already been 
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discharged.259  When Hamot did discharge the triplets to Mrs. Bimber two days later, 
she did not directly inform Flynn and Donich.  Mrs. Bimber did not return their 
multiple phone calls trying to ascertain the whereabouts of the triplets.260  In short, 
“the manner in which gestational carrier obtained custody of the children was fraught 
with impropriety, a fact completely overlooked by the trial court.”261  Moreover, the 
Superior Court characterized the conduct of Hamot personnel as “troubling.”262 
Turning to the legal issues, the Superior Court first addressed whether Mrs. 
Bimber had standing to assert custody rights as being either in loco parentis or the 
legal mother.263  The court rejected her claim to standing in loco parentis because she 
took the triplets home in defiance of the father’s wishes.264  The court reiterated the 
settled rule that “a third party may not intervene and assume in loco parentis status 
where the natural parent opposes such intervention.”265  Here, it was clear that Flynn 
never agreed to Mrs. Bimber’s taking custody of the triplets,266 and steadfastly fought 
for them. 
In order to have found Mrs. Bimber to be the triplets’ legal mother, the trial court 
had declared the surrogacy contract void as against public policy.267  Flynn argued, 
and the Superior Court agreed, that it was error for the trial court to have voided the 
surrogacy contract, for a number of reasons.268  No party had asked the court to 
invalidate the contract.269  Some of the parties to the contract, specifically Jennifer 
Rice and Douglas Bimber, were not parties to the Erie County litigation.270  Also the 
trial court had acted inconsistently; it had voided the contract but treated Rice as an 
“anonymous biological donor who had signed her rights away” by that same 
contract.271 
However, while rejecting the trial court’s invalidation of the contract, the 
Superior Court neither validated the contract, nor invalidated it on other grounds.  
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The court stated: “we decline to comment on the validity of surrogacy contracts, 
either specifically in this case or generally in this Commonwealth.”272 
The Superior Court reversed the finding that Mrs. Bimber is the triplets’ legal 
mother, primarily because of the failure to notify Rice, the biological mother.  In the 
absence of notice to Rice, “the [trial] court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue of 
who was the ‘legal mother.’”273 
In a brief footnote, the Superior Court stated that it considered, but rejected, the 
notion that Mrs. Bimber should be granted standing simply because she carried the 
triplets to birth.274   
Rather than remanding the case to afford Rice notice and the opportunity to be 
heard, the Superior Court reversed the trial court outright and directed that Flynn be 
awarded full custody of the triplets.275  Because the Superior Court decided the case 
solely on the issue of standing, it never addressed whether it was in the triplets’ best 
interests to be uprooted from their home with the Bimbers and transferred to Flynn’s 
custody.276  By happenstance, Flynn was exercising partial custody of the triplets on 
the day the Superior Court handed down its decision, so he simply retained 
possession of them.  He allowed the Bimbers to visit the triplets that weekend, 
deliver their clothes and effects, and say goodbye.277 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear Mrs. Bimber’s appeal,278 
rendering the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision the final Pennsylvania decision 
in the custody case. 
Given the importance of the issues in the case, not only for all the parties 
concerned but for the general public and the legislature, it is unfortunate that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.  Nor was there anything inevitable 
about the Superior Court’s resolution of the case.  Some other jurisdictions might 
well have reached a contrary result.  Under the United Kingdom’s Human 
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Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, surrogacy agreements are legally 
unenforceable, and “[t]he woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of 
the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be 
treated as the mother of the child.”279  The Utah legislature enacted essentially 
identical statutory provisions, but they were struck down as applied by a federal 
district court.280 
Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had rejected the Utah and UK 
legislative approaches, Mrs. Bimber might still have prevailed under a “best interests 
of [the] child” analysis, which at least one scholar has suggested in cases of 
“disputed maternity.”281  California Supreme Court Justice Kennard argued for such 
an approach in her dissent in the factually similar case of Johnson v. Calvert: 
Unlike the majority, I do not agree that the determinative consideration 
should be the intent to have the child that originated with the woman who 
contributed the ovum.  In my view, the woman who provided the 
fertilized ovum and the woman who gave birth to the child both have 
substantial claims to legal motherhood.  Pregnancy entails a unique 
commitment, both psychological and emotional, to an unborn child.  No 
less substantial, however, is the contribution of the woman from whose 
egg the child developed and without whose desire the child would not 
exist. 
For each child, California law accords the legal rights and responsibilities 
of parenthood to only one “natural mother.”  When, as here, the female 
reproductive role is divided between two women, California law requires 
courts to make a decision as to which woman is the child’s natural 
mother, but provides no standards by which to make that decision.  The 
majority’s resort to “intent” to break the “tie” between the genetic and 
gestational mothers is unsupported by statute, and, in the absence of 
appropriate protections in the law to guard against abuse of surrogacy 
arrangements, it is ill-advised.  To determine who is the legal mother of a 
child born of a gestational surrogacy arrangement, I would apply the 
standard most protective of child welfare—the best interests of the 
child.282 
                                                                
279Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, §§ 36, 27, (Eng.).  See also, 
Margaret Brazier, Susan Golomboke & Alastair Campbell, Surrogacy: Review for the UK 
Health Ministers of Current Arrangements for Payments and Regulation, 3 HUM. REPROD. 
UPDATE 623 (1997). 
280J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d  1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2003) (concluding that the statute’s 
presumption that a surrogate mother is the legal mother of the child violates couple’s 
fundamental rights to bear and raise children). 
281Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of Legal 
Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REV. 127, 130 (2000). 
282851 P.2d 776, 788-89 (Cal. 1993)(Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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This approach has been adopted by the Michigan legislature, which has not only 
outlawed surrogacy for compensation,283 but has also provided that the “best interests 
of the child” be the dispositive consideration in custody disputes concerning children 
born of surrogacy: 
If a child is born to a surrogate mother or surrogate carrier pursuant to a 
surrogate parentage contract, and there is a dispute between the parties 
concerning custody of the child, the party having physical custody of the 
child may retain physical custody of the child until the circuit court orders 
otherwise.  The circuit court shall award legal custody of the child based 
on a determination of the best interests of the child.284 
The main advantage to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of review was 
that it did make certain the triplets’ placement with Flynn, providing them with some 
stability at last. 
XIII.  LOOSE ENDS AND LOSERS 
While the custody battle over the Erie “surrogate triplets” has ended and the 
triplets now reside in Ohio with Flynn and Donich (to the extent that Flynn and 
Donich actually live together), related litigation continues in three jurisdictions at 
this writing.  In May 2005, Flynn and Donich sued Steven Litz and Surrogate 
Mothers, Inc. (SMI) in Indiana for negligence and breach of contract arising from 
Litz’s work in drafting and execution of the surrogacy contract.285  In December 
2007, by a 4-3 vote, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the decision of the Ohio 
Court of Appeals that the surrogacy contract was valid and enforceable.286  However, 
the majority also concluded that it was improper for the Court of Appeals to have 
assessed monetary damages for breach of contract (return of monies paid under the 
contract, return of court-ordered child support, and attorney fees), and remanded the 
case to the Ohio trial court to determine damages.287  In November 2006, Flynn and 
Donich sued the Hamot Medical Center for wrongfully discharging the triplets to 
Mrs. Bimber and related actions.288  Flynn and Donich alleged that they had spent 
more than $200,000 in legal fees to secure custody of the triplets.  Additionally, 
Flynn brought an action in Erie County, Pennsylvania, in May 2006, against Ms. 
Bimber to recoup the $43,000 in child support he was ordered to pay her while the 
                                                                
283MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (2002).  Cf. Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d 484 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
284MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.861 (2002). 
285Complaint at 3,5, Flynn v. Litz, No. 55D01-0504-CT-0211 (Ind. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 
2005).   
286J.F. v. D.B., Slip Opinion No. 2007-Ohio-6750, pp. 3-4. 
287Id. at 4.  
288Complaint at 5-6, Flynn v. Hamot Med. Ctr., Civ. Div. No. 14676-06 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
filed Nov. 13, 2006).  At this writing, the pleadings are closed in this case, and there has been 
no discovery as of yet.  Telephone Conversation with Neal Devlin, Esq., Co-Counsel with 
Francis Klemensik, Esq., Knox Law Firm, Erie, Pa, for Hamot Medical Center (Aug. 13, 
2007). 
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triplets were in her care.289  Judge Kelly issued a decision in March 2007 denying 
relief on the basis that the support order was valid until it was vacated by the 
Superior Court in April 2006 and that a father has a duty to support his children.290  
In January 2008, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed that decision, finding that 
Flynn had an absolute duty to support his children and his court-ordered support 
payments did not unjustly enrich Ms. Bimber.291  Since the Ohio Supreme Court had 
ruled a few weeks earlier that the Bimbers are potentially liable to Flynn to repay the 
court-ordered support (as well as other damages), this creates a potential 
constitutional battle over which state’s ruling on child support is entitled to full faith 
and credit. 
Other than perhaps some of the lawyers involved, it is difficult to find any 
winners in this saga.  James Flynn and Eileen Donich did obtain the triplets, but at 
great effort and expense, and after not being able to raise them for the first two-and-
a-half years of their lives.  As of now, Flynn has a claim against the Bimbers in Ohio 
for a substantial amount of money, but even if the Ohio courts finally impose 
judgment in a definite amount, it is difficult to believe that the Bimbers will ever be 
able to pay back the contract money, child support and attorneys fees.  The Bimbers 
have lost the three children they raised for some two-and-a-half years, with no right 
to ever see them again and the very real possibility of a large monetary judgment 
against them which it appears they cannot possibly pay.  The Bimbers’ three other 
children have lost the triplets that they had come to know as their brothers.  Jennifer 
Rice, who believed that she was “donating” her eggs (undoubtedly for 
compensation)292 as part of a private surrogacy agreement, found herself dragged into 
very public, multi-state litigation, in which at times she was induced to assert 
parental rights which it is abundantly clear she had no real interest in exercising.  
Steven Litz, SMI, and Hamot Medical Center face years of litigation, loss of 
reputation and potential money judgments. 
Last, and most important, are the triplets themselves.  For two-and-a-half years, 
they were locked in a tug of war between parent figures who could not even agree on 
their names.  Now, at age four, they are in the custody of a man and a woman in their 
sixties, who may or may not live together, and may or may not be married. 293  The 
triplets have no contact with the family that reared them for the first two-and-a-half 
years of their lives.294  
                                                                
289Flynn v. Bimber, Docket No. NS 200601089 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. March 2007). 
290Id. 
291J.F. v. D.B., 2008 PA Super. 2. 
292See Stack, supra note 23. 
293Throughout this litigation, Flynn and Donich have never been described by any court as 
being married, and, as noted, their willingness or financial ability to marry was the subject of 
some dispute.  However, in the caption of their November 2006 lawsuit against Hamot 
Medical Center, they are listed as “James O. Flynn and Eileen Donich, his wife, Plaintiffs.”  
Flynn v. Hamot, Civ. Div. No. 14676-06.  Of course, it is possible that they got married 
sometime between the last evidentiary hearing and November 6, 2006, when Flynn verified 
the Complaint. 
294Email from Joseph P. Martone, Esq., counsel for the Bimbers (Feb. 10, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
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XIV.  A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION? 
No matter what one’s opinion of the triplets’ ultimate placement with the 
biological father, the Erie “surrogate triplets” case can only be viewed as a tragedy 
and a failure of the legal system.   
Throughout the litigation, judges in both Pennsylvania and Ohio have decried the 
void in legislation addressing the contentious issues surrounding surrogacy.  Perhaps 
the most articulate comment on the case was made by President Judge Slaby of the 
Ohio Court of Appeals, concurring in that court’s judgment.  Judge Slaby wrote: 
The majority points out that there are only a few states that have even 
begun to address the issue of determining who the parents of a surrogate 
child may be.  Even the few states that have begun to address the issues 
involved have approached the issues from four different directions. Unless 
the state legislators begin to address the multiple issues involved, it will 
be the children that will be caught in a continual tug of war between the 
egg donor or donors, the sperm donor or donors, the surrogate parent or 
parents, and those that simply want to adopt a child from what they 
perceive as the ideal parents.295 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 
has attempted to fill this void, with, at best, limited success.    In 1988, NCCUSL 
proposed the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA), 
but because of disagreement among the Commissioners, that act offered two 
alternatives:  to either allow but regulate or prohibit surrogacy agreements.  Only two 
states enacted the USCACA and they took opposite positions; Virginia chose to 
regulate such agreements, and North Dakota opted to declare them invalid.296 
After the USCACA failed to gain support in the vast majority of state 
legislatures, NCCUSL withdrew that act and tried again in 2000 with a complete 
revision of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).297  Article 8 of the UPA (2000), which 
has since been revised in 2002, attempts to clarify legal parenting of a child born as 
the result of a “gestational agreement.”298  Article 8 recognizes that conception 
through surrogacy is here to stay so, unlike the USCACA, it does not give states the 
option of outlawing surrogacy outright.  Of course, any state remains free not to 
enact the UPA (2000), to enact it without Article 8, or to enact it with a modified 
version of Article 8.299 
Article 8 contains a critical provision which, had it been enacted and utilized in 
the triplets case, would have avoided the tragic (and expensive) litigation concerning 
the Erie triplets.  It provides that, “[a] gestational agreement is enforceable only if 
                                                                
295J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)(Slaby, J., concurring). 
296See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8, introductory cmt. (2000) (amended 2002), available 
at http://www.law.upenn. edu/bll/ulc/upa/final2002.htm. 
297Id. 
298Id. 
299Id. Article 8 is a “bracketed [a]rticle.” Id.  The Act provides that “[b]rackets in the 
statutory text are inserted to warn legislative draftsmen in the several states that the suggested 
language is likely to be subject to local variation.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. I.   
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
34 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1 
validated” by a court prior to conception.300  The court must find, inter alia, that: a 
proper home study of the intended parents has been made and that the intended 
parents are suitable; “all parties have voluntarily entered into the agreement and 
understand its terms; . . . adequate provision has been made for all reasonable health-
care expense[s] associated with the gestational agreement until the birth of the child; 
. . . and . . . the consideration, if any, paid to the prospective gestational mother is 
reasonable.”301  Then, upon the birth of a child within 300 days of assisted 
reproduction, the intended parents are to file a notice with the court which validated 
the agreement, and the court “shall” issue an order:  “[(1)] confirming that the 
intended parents are the parents of the child; [(2)] if necessary, ordering that the child 
be surrendered to the intended parents; and [(3)] directing [the appropriate state 
agency] to issue a birth certificate naming the intended parents as the parents of the 
child.”302 
Article 8 contains two other highly relevant, and useful, provisions. It provides 
that “[a] gestational agreement, whether in a record or not, that is not judicially 
validated” is unenforceable.303  This would effectively require all parties to obtain 
judicial validation prior to conception.  There is an escape clause, however.  Prior to 
conception (but not thereafter), “the prospective gestational mother, her husband [if 
any], or either of the intended parents may terminate the gestational agreement by 
giving written notice” to all other parties.304  Additionally, the court may terminate 
the agreement upon good cause shown.305 
Article 8 has an additional provision designed to encourage contracting intended 
parents to seek pre-conception judicial approval of gestational agreements.  In the 
absence of such approval, “[i]ndividuals who are parties to a nonvalidated 
gestational agreement as intended parents may be held liable for [the] support of the 
resulting child, even if the agreement is otherwise unenforceable.”306 
While reasonable minds could certainly differ as to the wisdom of the legislative 
scheme proposed in Article 8 of the UPA (2000),307 or as to some of its details, 
surely it would be a vast improvement over the current situation in which most state 
legislatures have failed to address surrogacy through statutes and those that have 
done so have failed to act in a uniform manner.  As the Erie triplets case amply 
demonstrates, the state courts in more than one state might well be required to 
adjudicate issues arising from the same agreement. 
                                                                
300UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, §§  801(c), 803(a). 
301Id. art. 803(b). 
302Id. art. 807(a). 
303Id. art. 809(a). 
304Id. art. 806(a). 
305Id. art. 806(b). 
306Id. art. 809(c).   
307The American Bar Association has adopted the Proposed Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproduction (2006), Article 6 of which contains provisions paralleling Article 8 of 
the UPA (2000). See ABA Family Law Newsletter, http://www.abanet.org/family/ 
newsletters/2008/february.html. The Proposed Model Act Governing Assisted Reproduction is 
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf. 
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Unfortunately, most state legislatures continue to avoid the troubling issues 
raised by surrogacy.  The UPA (2000) was approved by NCCUSL in mid-2000.  As 
of this writing, it has only been enacted in seven states,308 and five of those states did 
not include Article 8 in their version of the Act.309  Only Texas and Utah have 
adopted the UPA (2000) with Article 8, and both of them modified some of the 
language in it.310  Even more discouraging, the UPA (2000) was only  introduced in 
two state legislatures (Alabama and Nevada) in 2007, neither of which enacted it; 
and so far in 2008, it is being introduced only in Alabama and New Mexico.311  Thus, 
despite the continued occurrence of well-publicized battles over children conceived 
through surrogacy, there is simply a lack of momentum among state legislatures to 
address this subject in a uniform manner and save other children, and other parties to 
surrogacy, from heartache and uncertainty. 
 
                                                                
308Uniform Law Commissioners, Uniform Parentage Act Fact Sheet, http://www. 
nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_fact sheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
309Delaware (13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-101 to -904 (2007)); North Dakota (N. D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-01 to -66 (2007)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§  7700-101 to -902 
(2007)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.010-.913 (2007)); and Wyoming 
(WYO. STAT. ANN. §14-2-401 to -907 (2007)). 
310Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§160.751-.763 (Vernon 2001)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-45g-801 to -809 (2005)). 
311See supra note 308.  
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